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Dick Hebdige, Terence Hawkes on Claude Levi-Strauss. “The Savage Mind” source_2 Mariam Fraser. “Pathological Normality” (FRONT, bilis 2000) source_3 Birute Pankunaite. article on “NowHere” exhibition. Lousiana, Danmark. “7 meno dienos", 23 August, 1996 keywords / Narratives: The object misplaced – inside the object – outside the object Passive – active – inert Stable structure – elasticity -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- source_1 Dick Hebdige, Terence Hawkes on Claude Levi-Strauss. “The Savage Mind” In The Savage Mind Levi-Strauss shows how the magical modes utilized by primitive peoples can be seen as implicitly coherent systems of connection between things which perfectly equip their users to ‘think’ their own world. These magical systems of connection have a common feature: they are capable of infinite extension because basic elements can be used in a variety of improvised combinations to generate new meanings within them. The concept of bricolage here is described as a ‘science of the concrete’, which has the original anthropological meaning of the term: Bricolage refers to the means by which the non-literate, non-technical mind of so-called ‘primitive’ man responds to the world around him. The process involves a ‘science of the concrete’ (as opposed to our ‘civilized’ science of the ‘abstract’) which far from lacking logic, in fact carefully and precisely orders, classifies and arranges into structures the minutiae of the physical world in all their profusion by means of a ‘logic’ which is not our own. The structures, ‘improvised’ or made up (these are rough translations of the process of bricoler) as ad hoc responses to an environment, then serve to establish homologies and analogies between the ordering of nature and that of society, and so satisfactory ‘explain’ the world and make it able to be lived in. The modes could be said to be functioning as bricoleurs when they appropriate another range of commodities by placing them in a symbolic ensemble which served to erase or subvert their original straight meanings. (Dick Hebdige, Terence Hawkes) Varenne: quotes from Lévi-Strauss (1963 [1962]) Claude Lévi-Strauss. "The Savage Mind". Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 1966 [1962] A wildly spectacularly untranslatable pun (Geertz [1967] 1973: 357) The classical passages that brought bricolage into the social sciences (pp 16-19) There still exists among ourselves an activity which on the technical plane gives us quite a good understanding of what a science we prefer to call 'prior' rather than 'primitive', could have been on the plane of speculation. This is what is commonly called 'bricolage' in French. In its old sense the verb 'bricoler' applied to ball games and billiards, to hunting, shooting and riding. It was however always used with reference to some extraneous movement: a ball rebounding, a dog straying or a horse swerving from its direct course to avoid an obstacle. And in our own time the 'bricoleur' is still someone who works with his hands and uses devious means compared to those of a craftsman. The characteristic feature of mythical thought is that it expresses itself by means of a heterogeneous repertoire which, even if extensive, is nevertheless limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever the task in hand because it has nothing else at its disposal. Mythical thought is therefore a kind of intellectual 'bricolage' - which explains the relation which can be perceived between the two. Like 'bricolage' on the technical plane, mythical reflection can reach brilliant unforeseen results on the intellectual plane. Conversely, attention has often been drawn to the mytho-poetical nature of 'bricolage' on the plane of so-called 'raw' or 'naive' art, in architectural follies like the villa of Cheval the postman or the stage sets of Georges Me1ies, or, again, in the case immortalized by Dickens in Great Expectations but no doubt originally inspired by observation, of Mr Wemmick's suburban 'castle' with its miniature drawbridge, its cannon firing at nine o'clock, its bed of salad and cucumbers, thanks to which its occupants could withstand a siege if necessary ... The analogy is worth pursuing since it helps us to see the real relations between the two types of scientific knowledge we have distinguished. The 'bricoleur' is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with 'whatever is at hand', that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The set of the 'bricoleur's' means cannot therefore be defined in terms of a project (which would presuppose besides, that, as in the case of the engineer, there were, at least in theory, as many sets of tools and materials or 'instrumental sets', as there are different kinds of projects). It is to be defined only by its potential use or, putting this another way and in the language of the 'bricoleur' himself, because the elements are collected or retained on the principle that 'they may always come in handy'. Such elements are specialized up to a point, sufficiently for the 'bricoleur' not to need the equipment and knowledge of all trades and professions, but not enough for each of them to have only one definite and determinate use. They each represent a set of actual and possible relations; they are 'operators' but they can be used for any operations of the same type. The elements of mythical thought similarly lie half-way between percepts and concepts. It would be impossible to separate percepts from the concrete situations in which they appeared, while recourse to concepts would require that thought could, at least provisionally, put its projects (to use Husserl's expression) 'in brackets'. Now, there is an intermediary between images and concepts, namely signs. For signs can always be defined in the way introduced by Saussure in the case of the particular category of linguistic signs, that is, as a link between images and concepts. In the union thus brought about, images and concepts play the part of the signifying and signified respectively. Signs resemble images in being concrete entities but they resemble concepts in their powers of reference. Neither concepts nor signs relate exclusively to themselves; either may be substituted for something else. Concepts, however, have an unlimited capacity in this respect, while signs have not. The example of the 'bricoleur' helps to bring out the differences and similarities. Consider him at work and excited by his project. His first practical step is retrospective. He has to turn back to an already existent set made up of tools and materials, to consider or reconsider what it contains and, finally and above all, to engage in a sort of dialogue with it and, before choosing between them, to index the possible answers which the whole set can offer to his problem. He interrogates all the heterogeneous objects of which his treasury is composed to discover what each of them could 'signify' and so contribute to the definition of a set which has yet to materialize but which will ultimately differ from the instrumental set only in the internal disposition of its parts. A particular cube of oak could be a wedge to make up for the inadequate length of a plank of pine or it could be a pedestal - which would allow the grain and polish of the old wood to show to advantage. In one case it will serve as extension, in the other as material. But the possibilities always remain limited by the particular history of each piece and by those of its features which are already determined by the use for which it was originally intended or the modifications it has undergone for other purposes. The elements which the 'bricoleur' collects and uses are 'pre-constrained' like the constitutive units of myth, the possible combinations of which are restricted by the fact that they are drawn from the language where they already possess a sense which sets a limit on their freedom of manoeuvre (Levi-Strauss, 5, p- 35). And the decision as to what to put in each place also depends on the possibility of putting a different element there instead, so that each choice which is made will involve a complete reorganization of the structure, which will never be the same as one vaguely imagined nor as some other which might have been preferred to it. The engineer no doubt also cross-examines his resources. The existence of an 'interlocutor' is in his case due to the fact that his means, power and knowledge are never unlimited and that in this negative form he meets resistance with which he has to come to terms. It might be said that the engineer questions the universe, while the 'bricoleur' addresses himself to a collection of oddments left over from human endeavours, that is, only a sub-set of the culture. Again, Information Theory shows that it is possible, and often useful, to reduce the physicists' approaches to a sort of dialogue with nature. This would make the distinction we are trying to draw less clearcut. There remains however a difference even if one takes into account the fact that the scientist never carries on a dialogue with nature pure and simple but rather with a particular relationship between nature and culture definable in terms of his particular period and civilization and the material means at his disposal. He is no more able than the 'bricoleur' to do whatever he wishes when he is presented with a given task. He too has to begin by making a catalogue of a previously determined set consisting of theoretical and practical knowledge, of technical means, which restrict the possible solutions. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- translation “…Tarp musu vis dar gyvuoja tokia veiklos rusis, kurios dëka mes galime techniniame lygmenyje pakankamai aiskiai isivaizduoti tai, kas spekuliatyviniame lygmenyje galëjo tapti mokslu, kuri as buciau linkes vadinti ne tiek primityviu, kiek “pirminiu”. Prancuzijoje si veikla vadinama meistravimu (bricolage). Seniau zodis 'bricoler' buvo vartojamas kalbant apie zaidima kamuoliu arba biliarda, medziokle arba jodinejima, bet visada jos reiske netiketa judesi, pavyzdziui, atsokusi kamuolá, pasiklydusi suni arba arkli, kuris issuka is tiesaus kelio, kuris viska daro pats, savo rankomis ir naudodamas, priesingai negu tam tikros srities meistras / specialistas, visokias, daznai atsitiktines priemones. Mitiniam mastymui budinga isreiksti save heteroklitinemis priemonemis, kuriu skaicius, nors gana didelis, vis delto yra ribotas. Ir sis mastymas, kad ir koki uzdavini sprestu, turi tenkintis siomis priemonemis, nes kitokiu neturi, Taigi mitinis mastymas yra tam tikra intelektualaus meistravimo rusis, ir tai paaiskina á akis krentancius jø tarpusavio rysius. Mitine refleksija gali pasiekti intelektualiniame lygmenyje – kaip ir meistravimas technikos lygmenyje – puikiu ir netiketu rezultatu.” “Meistrautojas sugeba atlikti daugybe ivairiu darbu. Bet jis, priesingai negu inzinierius, kiekvienakart nenaudoja specialiai tam projektui reikalinga zaliava bei irankiu. Jo instrumentu pasaulis uzdaras, ir savo zaidime jis laikosi taisykles issiversti su “parankinemis priemonemis”, t.y. su visada ribotu medziagu ir irankiu arsenalu, kuris, beje, yra heteroklitinis, nes jo elementai neturi jokio rysio nei su tuo momentu atliekamu darbu, nei apskritai su kokiu nors darbu; arsenalas susidare atsitiktinai, kai tik pasitaikydavo proga atnaujinti ir praturtinti atsargas, ar papildyti jas ankstesniu konstrukciju ir dekonstrukciju liekanomis. Taigi meistrautojo priemoniu arsenalas nera skirtas kokiam nors vienam darbui atlikti. Ji gali apibudinti tik jo instrumentarijus. /…/ Taigi tokie elementai tik is dalies specializuoti. To pakanka, kad meistrautojui nebutu reikalingi nei kitø amatu bei profesiju irengimai, nei ju zinios. Bet to nepakanka, kad kiekvienas elementas turëtu tik viena tiksliai apibrezta paskirti. Kiekvienas elementas atstovauja tam tikram konkreciu ir galimu santykiu visetui. Sie elementai yra “vykdytojai”, taciau juos galima panaudoti atliekant bet kokias to paties tipo operacijas.” “Elementai, kuriuos renka ir panaudoja meistrautojas, yra “tam tirka prasme riboti”, kaip ir sudedamieji mito vienetai, kuriu kombinaciju skaicius ribotas, nes jie pasiskolinti is kalbos, kur jau turejo tam tikra prasme, dabar ribojancia ju jungluma.” “… Ir mokslininkas, ir meistrautojas nuolatos gaudo “pranesimus”, taciau tie, kuriuos renka meistrautojas, tam tikra prasme jau buvo perduoti anksciau: kaip prekybiniai kodai, kurie apibendrina visa ankstesne profesine patirti ir kuriu deka galima naudingai veikti ekonominiu poziuriu visose naujose situacijose (vis delto su salyga, kad jos priklauso tai paciai klasei kaip ir ankstesniosios).” Claude Levi-Strauss ‘Mokslas apie konkretybe’ (“Laukinis mastymas”) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- source_2 Mariam Fraser. “Pathological Normality” (FRONT, bilis 2000) “Georges Canguilhem argues that one of the conditions that is enabling of life is the maintenance of a proper relation ‘between the environment and the living thing’ (Canguilhem 1994b: 3540, a relation ‘that determines what is normal in both’ (Canguilhem 1994b: 354). In order to be ‘normal’, the living being must be able to exercise a little bit of abnormality – ‘a margin of variation’, Canguilhem writes, ‘a latitude of deviation’ – which ensures that it can respond flexibly to changes in the environment. Without this elasticity, a situation may arise in which neither the environment nor the living thing ‘can vary without comprising the viability of the living thing irreparably’ (Canguilhem 1994b: 354). Should this occur, then ‘the apparent normality of adaptation is in fact pathological’ (Canguilhem 1994b: 354).” -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- source_3 Birute Pankunaite. article on “NowHere” exhibition. Lousiana, Danmark. “7 meno dienos", 23 August, 1996 Old newspaper (“7 meno dienos’, 23 August, 1996) with the Birute’s Pankunaite’s article on “NowHere” exhibition (Lousiana, Danmark) - deliberate description prevailing (being ‘inside the object’). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |